Research
Publications
Yang, Y. S. J. (2026). Motivation in All-Pay Contests. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(1), e70100.
Abstract
This paper studies how agents with monetary and non-monetary motivation interact strategically in competitions. Examining the question under an all-pay contest framework, we show that there do not exist pure-strategy equilibria when the competing agents share the same motivation. When agents with different motivation compete against each other, we determine the conditions for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria and fully characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria. The results help explain situations where prizes are ineffective in eliciting higher efforts in contests. They show that the discouragement effect is prevalent when competing agents harbor different motivation and illustrate how reputation and money can be complementary goods.
Working Papers
Discriminated but not Discouraged: Investment Responses to Algorithmic Discrimination (Job Market Paper; submitted)
Abstract
We study how individuals adapt their investment when an algorithm evaluates groups differently. In a pre-registered online experiment (N = 553), participants are randomly assigned to an advantaged or disadvantaged identity group and choose how much to invest to improve their probability of being hired by an algorithm that holds different prior beliefs across groups. Disadvantaged participants invest 17.7% more than advantaged participants, showing no evidence of discouragement in investment despite facing less favorable evaluation. We then test two interventions: “Role Model” treatments providing information about the behavior and outcomes of same-group predecessors, and a “No Risk” treatment that conditions payment of the investment cost on being hired. The “Role Model” treatments have limited effects, whereas “No Risk” increases investment among disadvantaged participants by 24%. This effect is significantly larger than the corresponding effect among advantaged participants. Our findings show that individuals can respond to algorithmic disadvantage by increasing rather than reducing investment, and that changing the economic consequences of investment generates a stronger behavioral response than same-group social information.
Work in Progress
Does Ambiguity Aversion Stem from Misperceptions of Variance? Some Experimental Evidence (with Margaret Samahita and Karl Whelan)
Abstract
While ambiguity aversion is well documented, it is unclear what motivates it. One possibility is that people believe more ambiguous payoffs imply greater uncertainty, in the form of higher variance. In an online experiment, we construct two lotteries that differ only in ambiguity while holding expected payoffs and payoff variance constant, and test whether informing participants that the lotteries have identical expected payoffs and variance affects ambiguity aversion. Participants first choose between the two lotteries and then reveal their ambiguity premium through an incentive-compatible switching task. Although the information treatment improves participants' understanding of the lotteries' statistical properties, it does not significantly reduce the ambiguity premium, nor is the treatment effect different among participants with correct ex-ante understanding. Text analyses of participants' stated motivation show that the information treatment changes how participants explain their decisions, despite their ambiguity premium being unaffected. Our findings suggest that correcting misconceptions about payoff variance alone is insufficient to substantially reduce ambiguity aversion.
Insights into Relative Income and Generosity (with Diogo Geraldes and Enda Hargaden)
Rejection and Toxic Messaging: Heterogeneous Responses in Online Dating (with Kun Wu)